Sunday, November 2, 2008

What Is Man?

The book I am reading at the moment features a intriguing (fictional) conversation between a Nazi officer and an American Jew sympathiser named Chris towards the end of WWII. Reflecting on the Holocaust the Nazi officer would ask himself, I quote:

‘How could we do this? The fine, cultured German people, after which I rattle off the names of musicians, poets, doctors, and list all our gifts to mankind. How could we do this? It will take the great philosophical and psychiatric brains a hundred years to find a standard of morals to explain this behaviour’
‘I’ll simplify it,’ Chris said. ‘You’re a pack of beasts.’
‘Oh no, Chris, we are not even to be classed with the beasts. Man is the only animal on the planet which destroys its own species. But how in the devil did I get involved in this? I’m no more guilty than you are. Less, perhaps. I’m trapped. But you, dear Chris, are all the moralists in the world who have condoned genocide by the conspiracy of silence.’
- Leon Uris,
Mila 18

I agree that man’s desire to do evil to his own differentiates him from the beasts. But does not our value of altruism also do so? So which is more characteristically ‘human’, a tendency towards good or evil?*

Well, quite clearly, most people value good more than evil. Most people believe it is valuable to pursue good. We expect this of each other
(but certainly not of animals). But at the same time I feel as though the practise of evil is more frequent than the application of good intentions. But maybe I only feel this way because I am reflecting on the Holocaust, which hardly enhances faith in the virtue of man.

I suppose Platonic and much religious thought would suppose that evil is more characteristic of humanity in their earthliness and deficiency. Really, I don’t know whether good or evil better describes us, but perhaps the capability of the choice between the two does. Animals are not accountable for their destructive acts, but nor are they worthy personal merit, for they act without consideration of the morality of acts.

Acknowledging this, to deny the ability to choose is to reject one’s humanity. Thus, the Nazi officer in Mila 18 does position himself with the beasts when he claims to be ‘trapped’. He denies that he has the choice between good and evil,
denying what is in essence ‘human’. I think morally, therefore I am human.

Mark Twain argued that, "Man [is a] machine - man the impersonal engine. Whatever a man is, is due to his make, and to the influences brought to bear upon it by his heredities, his habitat, his associations. He is moved, directed, COMMANDED, by exterior influences - solely. He originates nothing, not even a thought." (What is Man?)
I don't deny that, to some extent, a person is conditioned by their surrounds, however, this is not the sole determinate of actions. To argue such is to deny what it is to be human, and inevitably leads to fatalism - 'I can do nothing other than that which my upbringing has already determined I will do, thus none of my actions are my choice or of moral significance'. You may also have noticed that by Twain's own logic, his view is merely the product of his make and influences, and not based on the actual rationality or truth of such a view.

Richard Dawkins naturalist arguments are in a similar vein:
We, and all other animals, are machines created by our genes...our genes have survived, in some cases for millions of years, in a highly competitive world. This entitles us to expect certain qualities in our genes. I shall argue that a predominant quality to be expected in a successful gene is ruthless selfishness. This gene selfishness will usually give rise to selfishness in individual behaviour. However, as we shall see, there are special circumstances in which a gene can achieve its own selfish goals best by fostering a limited form of altruism {enlightened self-interest) at the level of individual animals. 'Special' and 'limited' are important words in the last sentence. Much as we might wish to believe otherwise, universal love and the welfare of the species as a whole are concepts that simply do not make evolutionary sense." (The Selfish Gene)

So, in Dawkins' view, man is in essence selfish. But there is nothing distinctive to man, except its concentration of certain biological characteristics also apparent in any animal. We are all a 'pack of beasts' - and this accounts for and justified any possible action. But, of course, such claims make no 'evolutionary sense' as they purely determined by Dawkins' own genetic formation. Transforming man into a pile of genes denies what is essentially human, and its attraction is not based on reason, but on avoidance of the implications of morality. Admit morality, and you admit culpability.


* By my definition, ‘good’ is love of God and love of others. Evil is the lack of love for God and others, manifested in selfishness and destructive actions.

1 comment:

Nate Raiter said...

I realise that I may been somewhat ambiguous in my comment, "I think morally, therefore I am human". By this I meant that the ability to think morally is distinctily human. However humanness does not depend necessarily on the ability to think morally. For example, newborn children do not think morally, yet are still human.